Download File KEY AVEST.txt
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Download File KEY AVEST.txt
When encrypting a file, the ransomware generates a per-file random 128-byte number (using the CryptGenRandom API). This number is then cut down to a 256-bit AES key, and used for encrypting file data. The ransomware encrypts the file data in-place (using memory mapping), encrypting up to 15,728,640 bytes. The AES encryption key is then stored at the end of the file, together with user ID and original file name.
When looking at the installation status in the Avast Dashboard and a device shows up as Pending Reboot, please Reboot that device. If the status does not clear there likely exists the reboot.txt file that needs to be deleted. It can be somewhat pesky to find at times, however, so please do the following:
We found samples of AvosLocker ransomware that makes use of a legitimate driver file to disable antivirus solutions and detection evasion. While previous AvosLocker infections employ similar routines, this is the first sample we observed from the US with the capability to disable a defense solution using a legitimate Avast Anti-Rootkit Driver file (asWarPot.sys). In addition, the ransomware is also capable of scanning multiple endpoints for the Log4j vulnerability Log4shell using Nmap NSE script.
A closer look at the HTA file revealed that the mshta.exe downloads and executes the remotely hosted HTA file. The HTA executed an obfuscated PowerShell script that contains a shellcode, capable of connecting back to the C&C server to execute arbitrary commands.
We found an Avast anti-rootkit driver installed as service 'asWarPot.sys' using the command sc.exe create aswSP_ArPot2 binPath= C:\windows\aswArPot.sys type= kernel. It installs the driver file in preparation for disabling the running antivirus product. We noted the unusual use of cmd.exe for execution of the file.
While AvosLocker has been documented for its abuse of AnyDesk for lateral movement as its preferred application, we note that other remote access applications can also be abused to replace it. We think the same can be said for the software deployment tool, wherein the malicious actors can subsequently decide to replace and abuse it with other commercially available ones. In addition, aside from its availability, the decision to choose the specific rootkit driver file is for its capability to execute in kernel mode (therefore operating at a high privilege).
Unfortunately there isn't any standard password database format. Every passwordmanager uses its own file format. Anyway, almost all support exporting to CSV or XMLfiles. This sounds good at first glance, but CSV and XML files aren't specialized passworddatabase formats, they only specify a low-level layout of the stored data (for CSV: data fieldsare separated by commas; for XML: hierarchical form using tags). These formats do notspecify the high-level arrangement of the data (for CSV: order/meaning of the fields; forXML: tag names and structure). Because of this, many users are confused when application #1exports data to CSV/XML and application #2 can't read the CSV/XML file, although it claimsthat it can read those files.
This help page details the expected CSV and XML file formats. Knowing the formats whichKeePass expects, you can reformat CSV and XML files exported by other password managers tomatch the KeePass formats. CSV files can be reformatted using e.g. LibreOffice Calc(see below).XML files can be reformatted using an XML editor.
KeePass can import many password database formats directly (see top of this page).Additionally, there are specialized KeePassplugins availablefor importing more formats (like AnyPassword CSV, Oubliette files, PINs TXT, ZSafe files,and many more). Using these plugins, you don't need to manually reformat the output ofother password managers; you can directly import the exported files.
The 'Account' field in a CSV file corresponds to the title field ofa KeePass entry, 'Login Name' corresponds to the user name,'Web Site' corresponds to the U